1: Pelzer 5-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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

FIG. 18—Population Density in Southeastern Asia. This map, like the one opposite, was originally prepared for Professor Jan O. M. Broek's article, "Diversity and Unity in Southeast Asia." He has described his method of compiling the data on densities as follows: "In order to present a comparable picture for the whole of Southeast Asia, the year 1940 or 1941 was chosen, and densities were calculated for administrative districts. This use of administrative districts for the sake of uniformity explains, for instance, the rather low density of the Annam coastal region, where the districts include large areas of sparsely settled uplands adjacent to the crowded coastal strip. The scale of the map required, of course, some generalizations where there were many small districts with differing densities (Tongking, Cochinchina, Java). Cities, where they formed separate census units, were included in the adjacent districts." A list of the sources used and further notes about the compilation are given by Professor Broek in his article (p. 180). (Reproduced by courtesy of the *Geographical Review*).

[p. 11]

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
1 [See p. 26, category 241 or 116. -- Analyst]

241 Van Beukering allowed an additional 200,000 hectares for coffee and pepper
311 ladangs; so that the total area amounts to about 8,000,000 hectares. If we
134 assume that the population of the Outer Islands increases at the rate of 1½ to 2½ per cent each year, it would double in from 29 to 47 years. This would mean that after about 30 to 50 years 16,000,000 hectares would come within the scope of shifting cultivation.

361 In Malaya ladang cultivation is illegal, but it is practiced in the hinterland well away from roads and railways, in eastern sections of the peninsula. Dobby recently described it in Pahang and northeastern Kedah, near the Thai border.[30] The Sakai of Pahang regularly abandon their primitive huts as well as the clearings when they shift to a new field (Map, Fig. 2).1 The Malays of northeastern Kedah, on the other hand, as a rule live permanently in one place and change only their fields (Map, Fig. 3).1 There are no statistics available on the areal extent to which shifting cultivation is carried on in Malaya, but according to Dobby the system gives way to permanent culture "as the standard of cultivation rises and as the effect of law becomes stronger."[31]

In Thailand shifting cultivation is extensively practiced by the tribes of the mountains of the north and west, on the eastern part of the Khorat Plateau, and on the peninsula. Probably about 1,000,000 people depend upon it. According to the same kind of calculation that Van Beukering made for the Indies, a total of 1,400,000 hectares would be required, or 200,000 hectares annually, if we allow five persons per household and consider that one hectare covers the needs of a family for 2 years.[32]

●[162] In Indochina only the tribes of the mountains of Tongking, Laos, and Annam now practice rây, or shifting, cultivation. The people of the plains, Annamese and Cambodians, who represent 84 per cent of the population, practice a more intensive form of agriculture. Gourou has estimated the areal extent of shifting cultivation in Indochina. He states that a rây is used for 2 years and has to lie fallow for at least 20 years, which seems a rather long period as compared with other countries. In addition to its extensive plains, Indochina has a mountainous or hilly area of 580,000 square kilometers. Only one per cent of this land is permanently cultivated. Gourou estimates that about 40 per cent of the mountainous country is suitable for rây cultivation and he assumes that one-tenth of this, or 4 per cent of the total mountain land, is under rây cultivation in any one year.[33] If this calculation is correct it would mean that 23,200 square kilometers, or 2,320,000 hectares, are occupied annually by shifting cultivators. The numerical strength of the shifting tribes shows, however, that this estimate cannot be correct. Their number is not much greater than

[30] Dobby: "Settlement Patterns in Malaya," 1942, p. 222.
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] For an excellent description of the life of the shifting cultivators in Thailand, see Credner: Siam, 1935, pp. 148–173.
[33] Gourou: L'utilisation du sol, 1940, pp. 177–182, especially pp. 180 and 182.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
4[See p. 27, category 116. -- Analyst]

1,500,000, or at the most 2,000,000, which would mean about 300,000 to 400,000 households. This number of households could hardly occupy such a large rây area as Gourou assumes.

In Formosa only the Malay tribes of the mountains in the eastern half of the island practice shifting cultivation. They number, according to estimates, about 150,000. From this we may assume that not more than 30,000 to 50,000 hectares are occupied annually by shifting cultivators.

In the Philippines it is unlawful to make caiñgins on public land without the permission of the Bureau of Forestry.[34] Permission will be given if the forest on the land involved is of no commercial value and if the caiñgero accepts the obligation to reforest his patch with seeds supplied by the forest service. Several hundred caiñgeros are brought annually before the justices of the peace, who in the past, because their sympathy was with the caiñgeros, were usually rather reluctant to fine the culprits (Table II). Nobody knows, of course, how many illegal caiñgins escape detection, but it is certain that they greatly outnumber those that are made with the permission of the foresters added to those that have been brought to the attention of the courts. Special consideration is given to the "non-Christian" tribes, for whom tracts of land have been set aside within which they continue their age-old system of cultivation. In Mindanao probably three-fourths of the population, from the primitive Manobos to the more advanced Moros, practice the caiñgin system of cultivation. Other regions where this system is practiced extensively are Mindoro, Cebu, southern Negros, and parts of Luzon—the central and eastern cordillera and the Camarines. About 10 per cent of the population of the Philippines obtain a part or all of their food from caiñgins, most of which are made either on private land or on land that belongs to non-Christian tribes who know no other form of agriculture.

Methods of Eliminating the Undesirable Aspects of Shifting Cultivation

In regions where the density of population exceeds 50 persons per square kilometer, shifting cultivation becomes wasteful and destructive. It is imperative in such areas that the system be either modified or else replaced by more conserving and, where possible, more intensive forms of land use. For most backward tribes this involves fundamental changes in their mode of life, religious ideas, and concepts of land rights.

In some instances it should suffice to adopt measures that eliminate the harmful or wasteful after effects of the system without requiring that this kind of land use be given up completely. Let us assume that we have a somewhat thinly settled region containing a forest that is not particularly valuable and the exploitation of which is impracticable or at present inexpedient. Deforestation and the spread of grasses are undesirable aspects

[34] Nano: "Kaiñgin Laws," 1939, pp. 87–92.

1: Pelzer S-5 (1940-1941) 1945 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

241 231 185 to apply it regularly to his fields in order to keep up the fertility which formerly was restored through long forest fallow. This animal fertilizer is more important than the help the peasant gets from his animals in the way of labor. Thus the area to be cultivated may be limited by the amount of manure available, rather than by the extent of land that can be plowed.

Van Beukering, in his summary of the results of the ladang *enquête*, is of the opinion that similar practices should be introduced in the Outer Islands of the Netherlands Indies; but the pasture problem must first be carefully studied before mixed farming can be widely established in the Indies. Where animal manure is not available, the composting of vegetable waste, or even of crops grown for this specific purpose, supplies an excellent fertilizer.

The intensification and modification of shifting cultivation are less difficult in flat country than on sloping land where there is the hazard of soil erosion. Perhaps the most obvious solution would be to move the population from mountainous land to the plains and valley floors, but this can be done only in areas where population density is low. In Southeastern Asia [162] the density of population on the plains is usually so high that, should it be possible to bring malaria under control, a movement from the plains to the uplands and mountains would be desirable rather than a migration in the opposite direction. Another solution would be to have the shifting cultivator plant permanent tree crops to protect the soil against accelerated erosion. Steep slopes which now produce but a single moderate rice crop every few years could be made more productive if planted with perennials. The cultivator could then buy his staple food with the money obtained from the sale of the crops harvested from his trees.

000 The speed with which the change from shifting cultivation to permanent cultivation may be made will depend both on the geographical environment and the cultural level of the community. Shifting cultivators with permanent villages and a regularly established rotation of fields will respond much more readily to a reform brought from the outside than a group that is always ready to abandon its dwellings and move to a new locality.

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PART I

THE AREA AS A WHOLE

CHAPTER I

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

162 At the present time the number of persons regarding themselves as of Chinese race in Southeast Asia—Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines—probably exceeds 8½ million in a total population of about 157 million. This means that the Chinese account for only 5 or 6 per cent. of the total, but, as will appear from the following pages, their importance, economically and politically, is out of all proportion to their numbers and is likely to be increasingly great.

The table on p. 2 represents the distribution of the Chinese in this area with what is thought to be a fair degree of probability.[1]

Having committed ourselves to this table, we should now try to justify it. There has been a great deal of loose statement regarding the number of Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam and the Philippines, which has been due to political motivation as well as to misapprehension. The validity of our arguments in attempting to arrive at something near the real figure will depend rather on a general knowledge of what has been happening in the area in the last few years and a feeling for the probabilities than on an application of demographic equations to statistics of varying value.

The first difficulty arises from the definition of 'Chinese'; the second from the up-to-dateness or otherwise of the censuses or enumerations.

The census officials in Burma, Malaya, British Borneo, Indonesia, and the Philippines have always apparently regarded 'Chinese' in an ethnographical sense, or rather, any person regarding him or herself as a Chinese, or who is so regarded by the head of the household or the enumerator completing the return, is so accounted for in the census. In Siam and Indochina, however, persons born in the country have been regarded as citizens of the country unless

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[1] But see discussion in Postscript.

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[644] 162 their births have been registered with the consulates of their country of origin (in Indochina there was no Chinese consulate before 1935 and in Siam before 1946). In Burma the census report for 1931 stated that for some years it had been the custom for the male offspring of unions between Chinese men and Burmese women to assume the race of the father and for the female offspring to assume the race of the mother, so that, if we are to regard all offspring of the second generation of mixed marriages as Chinese, a considerable compensation has here to be made to the existing figures.

Ethnic[1] *Chinese in Southeast Asia*

Census figures in ordinary type: estimates in italics

	Chinese				*Total population (all races)*	
	1921 or circa	*1931 or circa*	*1937 or circa*	*1947*		*1947*[2]
Burma	149,000	194,000	..	*300,000*	16,824,000 (1941)	*17,000,000*
Siam	260,000[3] (1919)	445,000[3] (1929)	524,000[3]	*2,500,000*	14,464,000 (1937)	*17,359,000*
Indochina	293,000[3]	418,000[3]	326,000[3] *467,000* (1940)	*850,000*	23,030,000 (1937)	*27,000,000*
Malaya	1,172,000	1,704,000	*2,379,000* (1941)	*2,615,000*[4]	5,849,000[5] (1947)	5,849,000
British Borneo[6]	..	..	..	*220,000*	..	*878,000*
Indonesia	809,000 (1920)	1,233,000 (1930)	..	*1,900,000*	60,727,000 (1930)	*69,000,000*
Philippines	44,000 (1918)	*72,000* (1933)	117,487 (1939)	*120,000*[7]	*18,846,800*[8] (1946)	*19,511,000*
			Total: Ethnic Chinese (say	*8,505,000 8,500,000)*	All races (say	*156,597,000 160,000,000)*

[1] Except where marked 3 (see below).

[2] In this column all the totals by countries, except for Malaya where the 1947 census is followed, are those of the United Nations Statistical Office for mid-1947, cited at p. 13 of *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1948* (Lake Success, United Nations, 1949).

[3] 'Legal' Chinese (i.e. according to local law), i.e. Chinese citizens, or 'Immigrants from China'.

[4] Federation of Malaya 1,885,000; Colony of Singapore 730,000.

[5] Federation of Malaya 4,908,000; Colony of Singapore 941,000.

[6] 1921 census for North Borneo gave only 38,000; 1931 census gave North Borneo 48,000, Brunei 3,000, Labuan 2,000; an enumeration in 1939 gave 124,000 Chinese for Sarawak; 1947 census gave Sarawak 145,000. (Labuan was returned to North Borneo in 1946. 1941 estimate gave North Borneo Chinese 59,000.)

[7] An estimate of the Immigration Bureau (1948) gave 101,000 but 120,000 is here given to allow for illegal immigration, &c. (see text below).

[8] Estimate of Immigration Bureau.

Let us now consider the situation country by country.

In Malaya, at the census of 1947, 2,615,000 Chinese were counted. In this country 'Chinese' is more ethnographically exact than in any other country of Southeast Asia because since large-scale immigration from China began over half a century ago there has been

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

no miscegenation of any importance. Before then it was comparatively small.[1]

Siam, which next to Malaya has probably the greatest number of Chinese in the area, offers far greater difficulty. The Siamese census of 1937 placed the *immigrant* Chinese at 524,000. It is common knowledge, however, that the number of persons in the country who in appearance, custom, language, and sentiment are of the Chinese race is far greater than this. Indeed, now that the 'Chinese question' looms large in Siam, it is often whispered (and sometimes in responsible circles) that the number of Chinese in the country is 'over four million'. This figure the writer believes to be a great exaggeration. For one thing, the 1937 figure for 'legal' Chinese was probably not far from the mark,[2] and even if we included all persons of the second and even third generation (at which stage assimilation to the Siamese was usually complete) we should probably not reach a figure for that time greater than two million.[3] Since the census of 1937 the immigration of Chinese into Siam has been strictly controlled and was in 1949 subject to a quota of 200 per annum. Even allowing for a considerable illegal entry and a natural increase of 1·5 per cent. per annum it is not thought likely that the present figure is more than two and a half million—in all probability it is appreciably less. A different test that we may apply is this. For reasons of prestige the Chinese National Government has tended to state the number of its nationals abroad (and China, as we know, follows the *jus sanguinis* and not the *jus soli*) at the highest possible figure, but the official *China Handbook*, 1937–43, compiled by the Chinese Ministry of Information in Chungking, gives the figure as two and a half million for 1943, though the *Chinese Year Book*, 1943, compiled by the Council of International Affairs, Chungking, states it as three million.[4]

[1] The main reason is the Mohammedan religion with the alternatives of 'pork or no pork', 'dogs or no dogs'. Mr del Tufo doubts whether the number of Chinese Malay 'crosses' exceeds one or two in a thousand of the whole population.

[2] The Siamese census of 1947 gave Chinese in Bangkok, 284,519, Chinese in the provinces, 508,172, total, 792,691. These were Chinese holding aliens' registration certificates.

[3] This is the figure given by Mr Leonard Unger in his article 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *The Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) p. 199.

[4] Mr Unger (ibid.) reasonably says of the Chinese in Siam: 'If to the immigrants are added a second generation and those individuals in a third generation who still speak the language and keep up the customs of, and main-

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• 162 167 In the Philippines Filipino nationalism has for many years tended to magnify the number of Chinese in the islands since this was a matter of political capital, and before the Americans came certain Spanish interests had reasons of their own for stating the number as high as possible. But the numbers undoubtedly decreased during the war with Japan and since the liberation the Philippines Government has refused to allow the return of Chinese displaced persons except as part of a small annual quota.[1] Early in 1948 the Philippine Immigration Bureau gave the total number of Chinese in the islands as 101,000, but although to this figure a certain percentage should be added for illegal immigration (which is much easier to accomplish than in Siam, the Philippines being so near to China) it is thought that by adopting a figure of 120,000 a sufficient allowance has been made both for this and for any error in enumeration.

In Indochina where 'immigrants from China' are the only ones included in the census returns as Chinese, there have nevertheless been partial attempts in 1921 and 1931 to count the number of second generation *métis*, or offspring of Chinese fathers and Annamite or Cambodian mothers, and, making the necessary compensations and adjustments, we get a figure for 1937 of 326,000 'legal' Chinese plus 141,000 *métis* and a total of 467,000. This figure incidentally is about 40,000 in excess of that given by the *China Handbook*, 1937–43. (The official French figure for 1931 had been 418,000 'legal' Chinese, but the numbers had dropped considerably by 1937.) The official estimate by the Ministère de la France d'Outre-Mer was 850,000 Chinese in Indochina in 1947.

Other difficulties turn on the variation in the years of the available censuses. Malaya and Sarawak are the only two countries in the area which have taken censuses since the Japanese surrender.[2]

tain a loyalty to, their ancestral homeland, the total rises to about one million. This approaches two million if there are also included those who might be called "ethnic" Chinese—offspring of mixed Chinese and their parentage who show in their physical appearance and cultural characteristics an affinity with Chinese.'

Ta Chen, *Emigrant Communities in South China* (London, Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 264, quotes Lin Yu, 'Twin Loyalties in Siam', *Pacific Affairs*, vol. ix, no. 2 (June 1936) p. 191, as giving 2,500,000 as the number of ethnic Chinese in Siam and adds 'or about one-fourth of the population of Siam'—which involves a considerable under-estimate of Siam's population at the time of writing (1935).

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] A census was taken in Siam in 1947, but the only details of Chinese published so far are those on p. 3, n. 2.

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Chinese

For the other countries we have only censuses and enumerations of differing stages of remoteness. The problem is how to bring the figures up to date by estimation.

We may take it that in the undoubtedly favourable conditions afforded by Southeast Asian countries generally, a 'natural' Chinese population would increase by 1·5 to 2 per cent. per annum (and, remember, at compound interest). But one has to be careful because these immigrant populations are often not natural, i.e. they may have a lop-sided sex ratio and the age structure might be grossly distorted. Thus, to take an extreme example, you might have 800 men, 100 girls under 10, 50 women between 15 and 45, and no others women over 50—giving a crude birth-rate about 10 per mille—and natural increase nil! The Chinese in Malaya have increased by 1·8 per cent. per annum since 1931, and with a 1:1 sex ratio and settled conditions that figure might pass 2 per cent. But elsewhere sex ratio must be considered. All in all, it seems pretty safe to assume a 1·5 increase. But since the definition of 'Chinese' rules out any close estimation of their numbers, this rough-and-ready formula we have arrived at should be applied only where no estimate based on other considerations is acceptable. This is the case only with Indochina, British Borneo, and Indonesia and here it has, subject to known factors, been utilized.[1]

Mr Unger's map (reproduced as a separate folder)[2] will assist us to gain an idea of 'ethnic' Chinese in the region. It must be kept in mind (a warning repeated in Part VII, The Chinese in Indonesia) that it represents only the chief areas of concentration and has no reference to the comparative numbers of the Chinese and native population—the former being only 5 per cent. of the latter.

In Southeast Asia the Chinese are scattered through the countries in which they live, in large towns, villages, peasant farms, plantations, and mining communities. Sometimes the Chinese have come to an area already well populated and developed; sometimes they have opened up an almost uninhabited region. Java, perhaps the most densely populated area in the world, has at least three-quarters of a million Chinese, if not considerably more; the coastlands of West Borneo, almost uninhabited before Chinese

[1] I am indebted for these views to conversations with Mr M. V. del Tufo, Superintendent of the 1947 Census for Malaya.

[2] By permission of Mr Leonard Unger and of the American Geographical Society.

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Chinese

361 immigration, are also the site of a large Chinese immigrant community. Burma and Siam exhibit similar contrasts within themselves: between the densely settled delta of the Irrawaddy and the almost uninhabited Northern Shan States (where the Bawdwin mines are located), the two focuses of Chinese settlement in Burma; in Siam, between the thickly populated Menam delta and the Isthmus of Kra, almost empty until the advent of the Chinese.[1] In central Siam the Chinese live closely associated with the Siamese people by whom, until recent decades, they were completely absorbed within a few generations. In Siam about half the Chinese live in the lower delta of the Menam, in the neighbourhood of Bangkok; the remainder of the race are scattered through the country, living in villages and towns rather than rural communities and tending to concentrate in the more commercialized districts. A notable concentration of Chinese, consisting of the more recent immigrants, is to the southwest of Siam, where they work in the mines, on the rubber plantations, and as merchants in the villages.

Apart from the concentration in the Kra Isthmus region, the chief occupations of the Chinese in Siam are the various forms of retail and wholesale trade. The Chinese, in fact, control most of the retail trade in the country. In particular they have the lion's share in the rice distribution and milling, and there is scarcely a commodity from pepper to sugar in which they are not interested as middlemen. They also make up a large part of the class of skilled craftsmen.

Most of the Chinese in Siam originally came from Hainan, Mei Hsien, and Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow) in east Kwangtung. The last-named group is apparently in the majority, especially those from Chin Hai, Yao P'ing, Chi Yang, and Chao An.

In Malaya the Chinese have a special significance in that they are here the majority community and have been so since before 1941. In that year there were for the whole of Malaya 2,379,000 Chinese as compared with 2,279,000 Malays, though, excluding Singapore, which is virtually a Chinese city, the Malays still outnumbered them. By 1947 they had still further strengthened their position so that they accounted for 2,615,000 of the population, whereas the Malays were now 2,544,000. This outnumbering of the native population (though the Malays themselves have multiplied their numbers several-fold within the last few decades by natural

[1] Unger, op. cit.

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increase and by the reinforcement of Indonesians, mostly Javanese) has given rise to one of the most perplexing political problems in the Far East.

Malaya's Chinese are largely urban and are occupied in trade, but they also supply the bulk of the labour in the tin mines of which they own about a third. There is a large Chinese labour force on the rubber estates where, however, before the war with Japan, they were outnumbered by the Indians. In addition to these occupations, the Malayan Chinese are actively engaged in every branch of the trades and crafts, from agriculture (squatters) and pig keeping and poultry rearing (which they almost monopolize) to the building and skilled artisan trades, tailoring, dressmaking, and cobbling, and managing or working in oil mills, soap factories, shipping firms, sawmills, and many other undertakings. The pineapple industry is entirely a Chinese enterprise.

Most numerous of the Chinese tribes in Malaya are the Hokkiens, after them come the Cantonese, followed by the Hakkas (Khehs), Tiuchius, and Hailams (Hainanese), and in much smaller numbers by the Kwongsai, Hokchius, Hokchias, and others. The Hokkiens, being the pioneer community in Malaya and the principal merchants, are more numerous in the Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca, and the Cantonese more numerous in the remainder of the country.

A census was taken in 1947 for the first time since 1931 and tables and abstracts from this census, together with some observations of the Superintendent, Mr del Tufo, are included in Chapter XXV of this survey. The facts revealed are of key importance and those regarding the sex ratio are highly significant.

In Java the Chinese live throughout the island, usually in cities and towns rather than in the rural areas, and they are the middle-class merchants who control much of the wholesale and retail trade. Commerce and transport occupied 61 per cent. of the Chinese in Java in 1930: sugar processing, food industries, and timber were next among their occupations. In Batavia the Chinese formed 15 per cent. of the total population.

The people of south Fukien were among the earliest immigrants to Indonesia, especially Java. Some of the families have been there for almost two centuries (the founder of the Tsai (Tsoa) house landed in Java five generations ago, in 1753).[1] The Hakkas and the

[1] Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 266.

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people from Chao Chou (including the city of Swatow), the Teochius, and from southern Kwangtung, followed the Hokkiens. The Hakkas began to settle in West Borneo between 1740 and 1745, and were followed thither by Teochius. At first they were employed in gold-mining or were agriculturists, engaged in cultivation of rubber, pepper, and tobacco; but towards the end of the nineteenth century, when both plantations and mines grew up under European management, the Teochius and many Hakkas moved on to colonize Bangka, Billiton, and east Sumatra.

The Chinese of Indonesia, especially those of Java, have a much more noticeable admixture of native blood than have the Chinese of the other Southeast Asian countries.[1]

Chinese immigration into Indochina was directed principally towards Cochinchina and Cambodia and comparatively little towards Annam and Tongking which were already thickly populated, or towards Laos which was hard of access and little developed. In Cochinchina and Cambodia, however, the Chinese pervade every phase of economic life. The largest concentration of them is in the city-continuum of Saigon-Cholon. In these countries they have a virtual monopoly of the rice trade, just as they have in Siam (though attempts have been made to limit their share of the trade in both countries, especially in Siam). They are also engaged in pepper planting and vegetable gardening, but have taken practically no part in the newer estate agriculture of rubber, cotton, tea, and palm oil—indeed as aliens they were barred from the lands most suitable for this purpose.

As in other countries of the area, the trade depression of 1929–32 had a greatly restricting effect on immigration to Indochina, but in the few years before the Allied war with Japan this was recovering.

It has been convenient to summarize the distribution and occupation of the overseas Chinese country by country, but it should be remarked that this distribution is always dictated by economic considerations, as, for example, the belt of mining activity which extends from Burma round about Moulmein to the southward along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula through Siam and Malaya and then crops up again in the Dutch islands of Bangka and

[1] When attending a meeting of the Chung Hua Hui at Leyden in 1946, at which a hundred or so Indonesian Chinese resident in the Netherlands were present, the writer was struck with the dark complexion so common among them which was in marked contrast with the lighter complexion of the Chinese of most of Malaya, except parts of Penang and Malacca.

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Billiton, among the bauxite deposits of the Rhio Archipelago off Singapore, and finally among the oil wells of Palembang in Sumatra.

The Chinese of the Philippines form a group somewhat isolated from the main body, so to speak. They have traded with and emigrated to these islands for some centuries and they persevered



The Hakkas often inhabit the same areas as the Cantonese, Hokkien, and other tribes.

The following authorities, among others, have been followed: (1) Linguistic Map of China, *The Geographical Journal*, vol. cii, no. 2 (August 1943) p. 5; (2) Ta Chen, op. cit. p. 23; (3) W. J. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1936) p. 28 (map).

in their intercourse in spite of the intermittent severity and grudging tolerance of the Spanish. When, however, in 1898 the Americans assumed control of the islands, they extended to them the exclusion laws against Chinese immigration which were already in force in the United States. When the Filipinos took over the administration of their own country the term 'exclusion' (which had been subject at least to some liberal exceptions under the Americans) was more and more literally interpreted. But although

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609 their numbers are at present not very great in comparison with the
167 Filipinos, the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines
based, as ever, on their control of trade (they owned, before 1941
● 162 at least, three-quarters of the rice-mills), has been maintained in
the face of determined attempts by Filipino Nationalists to oust
them from it.

121 So much will serve as a general introductory survey of the distribution of the Chinese in Southeast Asia: in the first chapter of each country study contained in the successive parts of this survey, the subject will be dealt with in much greater detail.

167 The sketch-map of the principal places of origin in China of
162 the Chinese in Southeast Asia, reproduced on p. 9, has been designed by the author and executed by Geographia Ltd., and is subject to the following considerations. The shading indicates roughly the distribution in China of the several tribes represented overseas, but in the case of the Hakkas, of whom small communities are to be found throughout Kwangtung intermingled with the Cantonese,[1] only the areas most densely populated by them are shown in the map. Nor must it be assumed that the overseas Chinese come equally from all over the shaded areas. The fact (as Dr Ta Chen has pointed out) is that the communities from which the emigrants are drawn exist side by side with non-emigrant communities, and enjoy a higher standard of living than the latter.

[1] See L. Richard, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies* (Shanghai, Tu-se-wei Press, 1908) p. 207.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

CHAPTER III

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Indonesia OB1
Chinese

has been taken since then, and until a lasting peace has been established in Indonesia it is unlikely that any thorough census will again be attempted. This means that the figures concerning the Chinese in Indonesia were in 1949 already eighteen years out of date. However, since there had been no essential alteration in the distribution in this period we may, by taking into consideration the increase of other Chinese communities in the region as well as sex ratios, immigration, and other factors, hazard a guess that the ethnic Chinese population of Indonesia was by 1947 in the neighbourhood of 1·9 million.

The 1930 census of the Netherlands Indies, then, deals with 'ethnic' Chinese, as do those of Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines, whereas the censuses of Siam and Indochina deal in terms of nationality and not of race.

Mr Unger's map of the distribution of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia which is reproduced as a separate folder is a very useful companion for a survey of the Chinese in Indonesia, but certain facts regarding it must be borne in mind when it is used.[1] It shows the areas in which the Chinese are most concentrated, but it must by no means be presumed from this that the Chinese are not resident in other parts of the region, for indeed they do exist there and in considerable numbers. For example, the areas shown white in Mr Unger's map prove on reference to the map accompanying the 1930 census to be dotted with a considerable number of isolated groups of Chinese, some numbering between 250 and 500 persons and a few of between 1,250 and 3,000. But these two maps have different purposes—the first conveys a general impression and the second the minute detail in which only the specialist is interested (it indicates every group from one person upwards).

In considering the settlements in which the Chinese have attained considerable numerical strength there are only four which call for attention—one in a great circle round Singapore, another in the western part of Borneo, in the tin islands of Bangka and Billiton, and the Rhio (Riouw) Archipelago, a third in the Division of the East Coast of Sumatra, and the fourth in Batavia and its environs. In the first three areas live about 450,000 Chinese, or 17 per cent. of the total population of these parts: in Batavia and its environs their percentage of the total is 5. In the remainder of the

1 [i.e. 1930-49 -- Analyst]

[1] *See* Leonard Unger, 'The Chinese in Southeast Asia', *Geographical Review*, vol. xxxiv, no. 2 (1944) pp. 196–217.

2 [See end papers, cat. 116 - Analyst]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese

CONCLUSION

162 198 IT will have been observed that the Chinese of Southeast Asia are, in essence, the same people over the entire area, in spite of a considerable diversity in occupation and dialect, and variation in purity of blood. There is a concentration of Yunnanese in the Shan States, but this tribe does not occur in any numbers elsewhere, and the other tribes are unequally distributed. For example, the Hokkiens and persons of mixed race of Hokkien origin form the majority community in Malaya and Indonesia, being outnumbered by the Cantonese, however, in the Malay States. In Siam the Teochius and the Hakkas are more numerous than the Hokkiens, and Hailams are also a large community. In the Philippines three-quarters of the Chinese are Hokkiens, and most of the remainder Cantonese. In Indochina the Hokkiens, though numerically seeming to yield first place to the Cantonese, are the principal Chinese merchants: indeed they were the pioneering tribe in the Nanyang and they are still, on the whole, the wealthiest.

So much may be said to illustrate the diversity of the tribal distribution of these Chinese who, but for a few exceptions (such as a tiny freak pocket of Shantung people in North Borneo) originate from the southeast corner of China—a small bit of Marco Polo's 'Mangi'. Diversity of occupation again is very pronounced among 162 463 these emigrants. Hailams, for instance, tend to be pig and poultry rearers, small cultivators, and domestic servants; in Borneo the Hakkas are the most numerous community and here they are largely agriculturists. Cantonese and Hakkas supply most of the 181 Chinese labour for tin-mines and rubber estates. Nor should we accept the naïve statement that 'all Chinese are alike' (which is but an extension of the unobservant conclusion of the European tenderfoot that 'all Chinese *look* alike'). There is a notable psychological difference between, say, the volatile, nimble-witted Cantonese and the more phlegmatic Hokkien or Teochiu; the Hailams have usually quite distinct physical characteristics from other Chinese, being more delicately made and exhibiting marked cranial differences from their brethren from the mainland. As for the Hakkas, they are in some ways a people apart, of northern origin and later immigrants than the other tribes and deriving from islands of population surrounded by Cantonese or Hokkiens in

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL
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APPENDIX III

DISPLACED OVERSEAS CHINESE[1]

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THE largest group of externally displaced persons in China after the war with Japan consisted of overseas Chinese. These people, mostly small traders or labourers from the countries of Southeast Asia, Hong Kong, and islands of the southwest Pacific, were born abroad of Chinese parents or had worked abroad for years and had established domiciles in their adopted countries. Some were visiting their families in China and found return to their domiciles blocked after the extension of the Second World War to the Pacific in December 1941. About 3,000 skilled mechanics had gone to China earlier to help in the war effort against the Japanese, and these, too, were cut off from their homes abroad. Some had fled into China before the advancing Japanese and were cut off mainly in Hong Kong, Indochina, and Burma.

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Distribution of Displaced Overseas Chinese in China on 18 April 1946

Domicile	*Szechwan*	*Yunnan*	*Fukien*	*Kwangtung*	*Total*
Burma	873	5,794	20,626	2,098	29,391
Borneo	12	1	1,656	..	1,669
Hong Kong	619	..	879	101,185	102,683
Indochina	274	336	3,736	1,453	5,799
Malaya	737	665	23,426	2,486	27,314
Indonesia	194	181	14,640	167	15,182
Philippines	109	4	19,115	115	19,343
Siam	200	565	913	1,508	3,186
Other countries	344	..	..	..	344
	3,362	7,546	84,991	109,012	204,911

Thus stranded, the displaced overseas Chinese were scattered in Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichau, Yunnan, and Szechwan provinces, and in Taiwan. The principal concentrations were in or near the southern ports of Canton, Swatow, Amoy, and Foochow, the native districts and traditional embarkation points of most of the overseas Chinese, and in or near Kunming at the eastern end of the Burma Road. According to the Chinese Overseas Affairs Commission, there were, on 1 April 1946, approximately 200,000 displaced overseas Chinese in

[1] Authorities: Katrine R. C. Greene, 'Repatriating China's Expatriates', *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. xvii, no. 4 (25 February 1948). *New York Times* (6 April 1948). *Rehabilitation of Overseas Chinese* (in Chinese) (Nanking, Government Information Office, July 1947). *Negotiation of Immigration Problems* (in Chinese) (Nanking. Government Information Office, October 1947). *Preparatory Commission for International Refugee Organization*, Prep/32 (25 April 1947). Also information supplied to the writer by UNRRA officials.

[p. 682]

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the four southern provinces. About 100,000 were from Hong Kong and most of these would be expected to return by their own resources.

Since the above figures were found to include old registrations of persons who had returned home before the war reached the Pacific, or who had settled permanently in China, the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA in co-operation with CNRRA undertook downward revision resulting in an estimate of 42,000[1] as the number needing assistance in returning from China to their domiciles abroad. The number actually aided slightly exceeded this estimate, and the work involved in doing so was long and complex.

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For displaced persons going to some countries, especially Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, there ensued long periods of waiting in refugee camps while permission to land was being sought, and this led frequently to severe hardships. Some persons thus delayed found employment locally or, in desperation, tried to get back to their homes by any means they could, legal or otherwise; others endured privations until the necessary negotiations and arrangements could be concluded.

With some Governments there was no question regarding the granting of permission to return (e.g. Hong Kong), but the Philippines Government refused to receive any displaced persons except as part of the five hundred quota. With other countries there was a variation between these two extremes. In Indonesia and Indochina civil disturbances upset arrangements. Rising nationalism and the desire to establish greater internal control of economic and commercial life produced in some countries resistance to the readmission of overseas Chinese.

The UNRRA visa, recognized by five out of seven of the countries, was devised as a substitute for the consular visa in the absence of consular authorities at the port of embarkation in China. The cost of transport was U.S. $1 million.

Let us now consider the position in reverse—namely, the number of Chinese in Southeast Asian countries displaced from China and awaiting repatriation. The table on p. 684 shows the position on 30 June 1947.

In view of the refusal of the Philippines Government to permit Chinese displaced persons to return legally to the islands (except as immigrants on a strictly quota basis), the considerable number of Chinese returned to China from the Philippines appears outstanding; UNRRA used this figure as a bargaining point in Manila, but without success.

In Malaya, of the 78,502 persons (of all races, but the majority Chinese) *known* to have been sent to Siam by the Japanese to work on the Siam–Burma railway, 23,351 are recorded as having died, 15,987

[1] The analysis is not available.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

Chinese
Indians

APPENDIX V

INDIANS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

THE following note is appended to facilitate comparison between the Chinese and Indians in the area.[1] 162 •

Ethnic Indians in Southeast Asia

			1947
Burma	1,017,825 (1931)	887,000 (1941)	700,000
Siam	..	..	100,000
Indochina	..	..	5,000
Malaya	624,000 (1931)	744,000 (1941)	600,000
British Borneo	..	..	Few
Indonesia	..	..	30,000
Philippines			Very few
			1,435,000

Possibly because of the historic relations of ancient Hindu India with Southeast Asia, the prohibition of travel overseas imposed by the Hindu Shastras has not been taken to apply to Java, Sumatra, and Ceylon. There were early Hindu settlements, too, in Malaya, but these disappeared long ago and Indian immigration into the region dates virtually from the nineteenth century. 162 167

The only country in Southeast Asia in which the Indians are more numerous than the Chinese is Burma. After India and Burma were separated in 1936 uncertainty as to their future status caused thousands of immigrants to return home to India. Indian landlords and moneylenders liquidated their Burma holdings wherever possible. In 1931 there were 1,018,000 Indians in Burma; in 1947, in spite of natural increases, their number was probably not over 900,000. They retained, however, much of their economic importance. In 1931, 200,000 of the Indians in Burma lived in the Arakan Division nearest India. Of the total 618,000 were born in India—566,000 were Hindus; 397,000 were Muslims; the remainder were Sikhs, Christians, and others. Parsees were prominent in the professions; chetties (chettiars) from South India were the leading bankers with a big hold on the peasantry; Muslims from the Madras Presidency ran restaurants; the Gujeratis and Muslim Chooliahs from Madras had a large share in the hardware trade; Hindus from Upper India were the principal jewellers. Most of the common labour was performed by Hindu Telegus or Tamils. [463]

[1] I am indebted to Mr Edwin Haward for most of the material utilized in this note. V. P.

[p.691]

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese; Indians
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After Burma, the Indians in Southeast Asia are most numerous in Malaya, though here their numbers have dropped from 744,000 in 1941 to 600,000 in 1947. The great majority of them are Tamil labourers on the rubber estates, but there is also a considerable community of merchants and chetties who are the money-lenders of Malaya, lawyers, &c. The Sikhs number a few thousands and are agriculturists as well as watchmen and the like. Before the war Sikhs were more numerous in the Malayan Police than they had become by 1949. They made themselves exceedingly unpopular with the Chinese during the Japanese occupation.

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In recent times Indian public opinion has been exceedingly critical of Indian emigration to Southeast Asia in the form of unskilled labour, alleging unfair conditions. The Indian Emigration Act of 1922 was amended in 1938 to give the Government of India power to prohibit even unassisted emigration (assisted emigration was that which took the place of indentured labour) for the purpose of unskilled work. The result has been the virtual drying-up of India as a source of supply for labour, and many Indians have also returned to their homes. During the Japanese occupation casualties among Tamils were especially heavy. But now that India is independent her policy may develop on different lines—the economic pressure of population on her soil may tend to make her less critical of emigration, and as the most powerful State in the Southeast Asia area she may find it expedient to resort to something like the pre-war 'imperialism' which the party now in power in India was, during its period in the wilderness, so concerned to condemn. But the whole turn of events in Southeast Asia is bound to be profoundly affected by the success of the Communists in China, and in the attempts to oppose or to compromise with them India is bound to be a factor of the greatest importance.

2:Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1
Chinese
China AF1
Burma AP1

A visit to Southeast Asia during the third quarter of 1950 after an absence of nearly three years brought home to the writer the accelerated tempo of the change that the countries were undergoing, and, in particular, the dominant role which the politics of China were playing therein. As a tailpiece to this survey he has recorded the impressions of his visit, bringing the account as nearly up to date as the exigencies of publishing would allow. The observations are set down in the order in which the countries were visited.

In his many discussions with statesmen, diplomats, officials, business men, and others in these Southeast Asian countries, the writer became aware of a considerable disagreement among them regarding the number of Chinese in the area. There was, in the case of Siam and Indochina in particular, no figure that was generally accepted. The definition of 'Chinese' was an initial difficulty (as it has so often been in the course of this survey) for many Chinese appeared to possess a dual racial character, discarding one aspect and assuming the other as circumstances suggested.[1] It seemed also that that clandestine immigration into Siam, Indochina, and the Philippines and (perhaps) Indonesia within the last two or three years, had been very considerable, for during this period the immigration laws had been greatly tightened. The writer was compelled, therefore, to revise the estimates he had made in the demographic chapters of the survey to suit the probable facts of 1950 and to adopt a total not very far short of 10 million ethnic Chinese for the whole of Southeast Asia. This estimate, however, does not materially alter the ratio of Chinese to other races in the area and has no very important bearing on the general political and economic considerations which have been described in the text.

Burma. In July 1950 the Chinese Nationalist ambassador had left Burma, and one other official of the embassy had also gone away, but the remainder of both the embassy and consular staff had agreed to serve under the People's Government of China which was now recognized by the Burmese Government. Two of the staff had already been summoned to Peking for indoctrination. The new ambassador, Dr Yu, was expected to arrive in Rangoon in August. In the meantime the staffs were not being paid and the only income available was that derived from the sale of (Nationalist) passports.

At this time an incident in the Burmese Shan State of Keng-tung near Siam was the subject of a number of rumours. A force of Chinese

[1] Thus in Siam, the President of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, of very obvious Chinese race or extraction but with a Thai name, denounced vehemently the tactics of business men of acknowledged Chinese nationality in their dealings with the Thais.

2: Purcell G-4 (no date) 1951 AL1 Southeast Asia AL
Chinese

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

[end map A]

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways of

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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

FIG. 115.—Population Expansions of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia, diffusing new conceptions as it passed, re-establishing trading centres, drawing out the produce of Southeast Asia people and stimulating development of Southeast Asia as a source of trade rather than a passage for traders. It has been a century and a half of tremendous population increases, causing people to swarm upon the more fertile areas, upon deltas and volcanic cones where people had not clustered before. In these choice areas, the new deltas and the newer ejecta, the bulk of the great population increase has concentrated, so that upon them live teeming multitudes in limited zones separated by stretches of forest-covered space scarcely more populated now than they were several centuries ago. By the quinquennium 1916-20, the total population of Southeast Asia had become 84 million, by 1936-40, 120 million, and in this present quinquennium (1946-50) it is nearly 145 million. The increases, while general, have not been even (Fig. 115). Over the present century, of the political units, Java has been increasing very much faster than any other, and Siam has since 1911 so increased that its population exceeded that of the Philippines by 1933 and by now exceeds also that of Burma.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

SOUTHEAST ASIA NUTRITION DENSITIES
(Average number of persons per rice-acre per annum)

Quinquennium	*Burma*	*Indo-china*	*Siam*	*Java and Madoera*	*Philip-pines*	*Malaya*
1916–20	1.23	1.75	1.66	4.12	3.13	—
1921–25	1.19	1.67	1.57	4.27	2.67	5.61
1926–30	1.14	1.61	1.57	4.50	2.69	6.13
1931–35	1.19	1.64	1.63	4.60	2.76	6.42
1936–40	1.25	1.63	1.74	4.96	2.79	7.02
1946–50	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.9	3.9	7.2

Because population and the net production of food have increased *pari passu*, it is important to examine the "nutrition density" (persons per acre under rice) since the surplus for export depends on low internal consumption of the Southeast Asia staple and high internal production. The countries of Southeast Asia pre-war showed considerable differences in nutrition density, from Malaya (the plantation-mining specialist) with 7.2 persons per rice-acre, to Siam (the rice-surplus specialist) with 1.6. Malaya, Java and the Philippines had nutrition densities much higher than the rest of neighbouring countries and in the case of Malaya and Java the nutrition density had been steadily rising, whereas in Burma, Indochina and Siam it was fairly static. Over the same period, the domestic consumption of rice per person sharply dropped (by 20-25 per cent) in Burma, Siam and Java and rose about 10 per cent in Indochina, Philippines and Malaya. The postwar figures available show considerable increases of nutrition density everywhere except in Siam, yet these were changes of degree, not of pattern.

Changing Internal Emphasis

Today the very crowded places are firstly, Middle and North Java, Lower Siam and the Red River Delta, where densities of over 1,500 people per square mile occur, with secondary crowdings in Lower Burma, the Lower Mekong, Central Luzon and the Visayas. These concentrations of people are pre-eminently in agricultural areas (Fig. 116), and they are in fact largely made possible by exceptional soil qualities within an area whose general soil fertility is low. These crowded areas have taken part in a commercialisation of local agriculture and their subsequent history has been firstly a

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

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

FIG. 116.—Distribution of People in Southeast Asia

rapid increase in people to a point where the new agricultural development ceased to be enough for the large population, leading to the second stage of slow migration and emphasis on commercial agriculture upon newer zones of similar type. Hence the change of emphasis from Tonkin to the Annam coastal plains and then to the Lower Mekong; from the Central Luzon area to Visayan Islands;

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

from the plains of Java to the dangerous upper limits of the volcanic country; and from Dry Burma to the Irrawaddy Delta. Sometimes there has been a little agricultural migration—very largely this change has been brought about by different rates of growth rather than movement of people to new places. Everywhere commercialisation of agriculture has led to population increase, because the agricultural technique has not changed from the Southeast Asia tradition of manual work at every stage. The bringing of new areas into cultivation has been followed by an increase in the number of hands to do the cultivating, partly a response to the need and partly made possible by additional nourishment and an added vitality arising from lower disease rates natural to the less populated area, because human diseases are diffused more slowly where people are isolated from one another, as in new areas. Thus Southeast Asia has been the scene of intense pioneering by people seeking, developing and filling new agricultural areas, to create for a time the eldorado of rice-eating peoples and the one safeguard of Indians and Chinese against the vagaries of their own harvests and against the congestions of their home districts.

Minerals in turn have attracted external interest. There has been the pull of gold in the Philippines, of tin in Malaya and nearby islands, of petroleum in Sumatra and Borneo. These great gambles drew capital and pulled in crowds of labourers, wage-earners who were unavailable from local people so tightly held in their manual agricultural systems. Minerals drew millions of Chinese through the South China Sea in the tin rushes and oil rushes of the last hundred years.

Yet another form of commercialised agriculture developed, to provide the industrial raw materials of distant factories in Europe and America and based on crops entirely foreign to Southeast Asia. Sugar, coffee, hemp, rubber, oil palm proved highly successful in this terrain where they had never existed before. Large plantations of them were laid out, still more wage-earning labour was absorbed, a still greater production was obtained, drawing more and more people into virgin areas. Migrations from India and China were further stimulated to work upon the plantations whose uneven development, in successions of booms and depressions, alternately attracted migrants in the boom years and sent them home again in the depressions.

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Political Convergence

438 These local products for commerce not only stimulated export trade; they stimulated import trades to feed the migrant peoples, to dress them, and to dress the agriculturists so preoccupied that they could no longer spare time to weave for themselves. And trade itself drew external interests; Chinese and Indian traders came in to monopolise middleman functions and Europeans came in and worked out here the complex balancing of their own industrial systems far away. Britain stimulated the commercialisation of Burmese rice production as an assurance of cheap food for an industrialising, overpopulated India. The Dutch fanned out from Java into the adjoining islands. Not to be outdone, the French moved into Indochina as a base for their China trade. Germans for a time controlled the copra trade of the farther eastern islands. Thus all the major Western European powers had colonial interests in the expanding peoples, the expanding production and the expanding needs of Southeast Asia. And the major oriental powers, India, China and Japan, had equally direct interest in Southeast Asia (Fig. 117) as an outlet for their people, a source of rice, a source of raw materials for their industries, and finally as outlet for their own industrial products, India and Japan being mostly involved in this, the latest phase.

Internal Divergences

The resulting pattern of people is one of unparalleled diversity in stages of evolution from subsistence to commerce, in densities of people, in ethnic types, in languages (Fig. 118). The similarity of setting, circumstance and products have disrupted Southeast Asia within itself by economic rivalry in producing similar commodities, and the divergencies of overseas connections with different colonial powers established divergent trade streams, currency differences, educational differences and political differences. Political and economic forces released in Europe and America had their repercussion within Southeast Asia, by means of which French protectionist policies virtually isolated Indochina from its neighbours and Filipinos turned their backs upon Asia. Siam has been wooed, ignored or bullied, depending on the fluctuation of Anglo-French relations in Europe and the opportunism of the U.S. in building up its bloc in East Asia. All sorts of colonial systems have been

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 All Southeast Asia All

FIG. 117.—Pattern of Modern Migrations

experimented with, so that Southeast Asia has a great range of constitutional forms, from fossilised oriental aristocracies to democracies of a few intelligentsia and to would-be republics trying to combine the gestures of democracies with the powers of autocracies, the whole being permeated by complex trading systems of both Western and Oriental types. All this may be summed up by saying that the cross-currents and backlashes of the world's political and economic systems of the present and past still move

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
Southeast Asia AL1

563 foreign army of occupation has preserved it from disruption.
565 The essential and distinctive character of a plural society
433 is that it is dominated by economic forces, and, outside a
691 few partly sheltered oases, Southeast Asia illustrates the capitalist system in its purest form.[18]

162 Another common feature is the dominance of the agri-
171 cultural section of the population. The latest available
433 figures show the percentage proportions of population dependent
171 on agriculture in the area as follows: Burma, 68; Indonesia, 66; Philippines, 69; Thailand, 85.[19] The same source indicates the proportions for various regions of the world as follows: North America, 20; Oceania, 30; Europe, 33; South America, 60; Asia, 70; and Africa, 74.

171 With the prevailing techniques of production and the
433 consequent low productivity per man, dominance of agriculture
434 means low per capita national income. When countries are grouped by level of economic development on the basis of per capita national income as of 1950, all the six countries of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya, Philippines, and Thailand -- fall in the underdeveloped
443 group.[20] Moreover, there is in Southeast Asia a true surplus
464 population on the land in the sense that even under the
161 present methods of cultivation a sizeable fraction of the

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18. Ibid., p. 77.

19. Food and Agriculture Organization, 1953 Yearbook, Vol. VII.

20. Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), pp. 16-17.

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THE "MILLION CITY" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

D. W. FRYER

361 162 IN A world survey of cities with a population of one million or more, made in 1931, Mark Jefferson[1] could not include a single representative from Southeast Asia. Since 1945 five cities in this area have attained the million status—Jakarta, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, and Singapore. Of all the major political units in this part of Asia, only Burma has failed to produce a "million city." In Malaya, the most highly urbanized country, 35 per cent of the population live in towns of 5000 or more, and towns of more than 10,000 increased their population by 52.6 per cent in the last intercensal period, 1931–1947. But the concept of Southeast Asia as an area of rural peoples with a rhythm of life determined by rice cultivation is still largely correct. The proportion of urban dwellers is about the average for the Asian continent, and, except possibly in Java, there are far fewer cities, in relation to the level of population, than in either South or East Asia.

361 By Western standards the countries of Southeast Asia had only one city apiece until very recently. Most of the other settlements of any size were overgrown villages, and in some degree they still retain aspects of their village origin. In Southeast Asia the evolution of indigenous cities on the Chinese or Indian scale was not possible. Chesneaux[2] suggests that many of the large indigenous Asian cities grew up within "the traditional framework of the great agricultural empires," but in both peninsular and archipelagic Southeast Asia physical fragmentation, reinforced by a great diversity of peoples, hindered the development of large states. Though occasionally established, they were highly unstable and of short duration. The princely houses of the petty native states were insufficient stimuli to city growth, and commerce was equally inadequate. The only effective impulse, as Credner[3] points out, was a favorable combination of trade foci with administrative, military, and religious functions of the highest order. Dependence on changeable watercourses for irrigated rice culture and transportation, and the personal whim of the ruler, produced a marked arbitrariness

[1] Mark Jefferson: Distribution of the World's City Folks, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 446–465.

[2] J. E. Spencer: Changing Asiatic Cities, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 41, 1951, pp. 336–337, discussing Jean Chesneaux: Notes sur l'évolution récente de l'habitat urbain en Asie, *L'Information Géographique*, Vol. 13, 1949, pp. 169–175, and Vol. 14, 1950, pp. 1–8.

[3] Wilhelm Credner: Siam, das Land der Tai (Stuttgart, 1935), p. 366.

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Company from English and Chinese competition and be strong enough to deter native princes from interfering in the Company's activities. Essentially, commerce was of greater importance than administration in old Batavia, though the Company could hardly avoid participation in politics; the recent change of the city's name to Jakarta, the name of the native settlement on whose site the city arose, is indicative of a change of function as well as of political control. The city began its life as a storehouse, which was secretly fortified and after a successful defense against the English and the local ruler was made the nucleus of a new town. Expediency seems to have been the principal reason for selection of the site. Certainly the harbor had little to commend it, and early in the eighteenth century silting was already a problem.

Bangkok is the only indigenous city of Southeast Asia to attain a population of one million, at least in modern times, though Jogjakarta is estimated to have reached this level during the postwar Indonesian movement for independence. The geographical focus of Thailand is clearly in the lower Menam plain, but for four centuries the capital was Ayutthaya, some 60 miles upstream (1350–1767). After the destruction of Ayutthaya by the Burmese, Thonburi, a fort on the west bank of the Menam Chao Phraya, was selected as the new national capital, but in 1782 a further dynastic change led to the establishment of a new administrative capital on the opposite bank, then unoccupied save for a small community of Chinese traders. Situated on a bend in the river some 20 miles from the sea and surrounded by marshland, the site of Bangkok possessed the sole but great advantage of being easily defended.

Saigon, like Bangkok, is a riverine city and tidal port set in a broad alluvial lowland, but it is more than twice as far removed from the sea. When captured by the French in 1859, it was the main political center of the newly colonized Annamese land of Cochin China and consisted of an agglomeration of native huts around the imperial fortress, with virtually no permanent buildings. The French immediately began its reconstruction as a modern city, so that, unlike the other four cities, Saigon has no old core. Nothing is left at present of the native town. Cholon, the "great market" some three miles to the west along the Arroyo Chinois, is an entirely separate Chinese foundation dating from about 1778. Though the cities have now coalesced, each retains its own distinctive character and functions, and the "Région de Saigon-Cholon" is thus a true twin city, unique in Southeast Asia.

Singapore is anomalous in being situated on an island, and, like Bangkok,

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permanent buildings and roads did not exist and all communication was by boat along the canals, or "klongs." [503] 361

Singapore possessed the advantage of greater topographic variety. Eminences of granite formed good sites for public buildings, and the city spread out over the land above flood level on both sides of the swampy Singapore River.

All the old towns, with the exception of the architecturally exotic Bangkok, have a gridiron layout, which has meant the maximum of congestion in modern times. Racial zonation, well marked in the old towns, has tended to persist. Europeans have long since abandoned their old quarters, but the Chinese have remained in strength; indigenous peoples, however, are significantly absent. In Manila and Bangkok the old cores have been retained intact and new business and financial quarters have been created away from the old cities. Though Intramuros has lost its military functions and most of its administrative ones, it still keeps, in part, those of a judicial and religious nature. Old Bangkok, however, has lost little of its earlier importance and is one of the greatest tourist attractions in Southeast Asia. In Singapore and Jakarta the old core has been reconstructed as the business district, but since this took place before the advent of the motor vehicle, congestion is still acute. Saigon, having no old core and therefore able to plan its development without encumbrances, nevertheless also adopted a gridiron layout, but it is not easy to suggest an alternative that would have made better use of the environment. 162 361

The Expansion of the Cities

The rapid growth of the cities in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries has been due to the investment of capital, largely from the mother country, in production for export; the consequent improvement of the ports and the creation of a communications network focusing on them; a considerable increase in the scope of administrative activities; and, more recently, the establishment of secondary industries. Though these have provided the impetus, expansion has been possible only through the application of new techniques of engineering (particularly in drainage and water supply) and preventive medicine, making the cities as healthy as those of the West. 361

The three centuries of stagnation in Manila is a remarkable historical record. Expansion beyond the walls of Intramuros began almost a century later than the growth of old Batavia, which too had suffered a period of stagnation in the seventeenth century. Even the short British occupation (1762–1764) and the revolt of the American colonies failed to arouse Spanish interest in the distant possession, and the growth of Manila in the latter half

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of the nineteenth century was a reflection of the investment of foreign capital in the archipelago, stimulated by the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1863 relocation of the administrative area began, with the move of the Governor to the Malacañan Palace, north of the river, and in the last three decades of Spanish rule development on the north bank of the Pasig was rapid. After the American occupation Manila grew quickly. A modern harbor was constructed on reclaimed land on the seaward side of Intramuros (1903), and the main development of the city was shifted south of the Pasig, where new administrative and residential districts were created. Since World War II the city has again expanded, owing partly to an influx of population from the country, and partly to the use of reconstruction funds for development. The built-up area is now practically continuous from the swamps of the Bitas River mouth in the north to Parañaque in the south, a distance of about 10 miles. Northeast and southeast of the urban fringe, rice fields still cover the plain, and parts of the city itself are regularly flooded in the rainy season (April-October). Development has proceeded farthest inland on the higher ground between the coastal plain and the Marikina River, which drains southward to the Pasig. Here are the newer districts of Mandaluyong, San Juan del Monte, and Quezon City, the last virtually a satellite town, which is the new administrative center of the Republic.

As a result of its long history and changing administration, Manila has a greater variety of architectural styles and street patterns than the other four cities. Old buildings of wood and adobe in the colonial style were found in Intramuros (which was largely destroyed in 1945) and occasionally outside, but in the main business district in Binondo and in the administrative quarter of Ermita modern steel-framed concrete buildings now predominate. Manila is not a city of skyscrapers. Good foundations are impossible in the alluvial sediments, and deep piling to reach the underlying granite or "floating" on enormous cellular rafts of concrete is necessary for large buildings in all the great cities. In the districts of earliest expansion, radiating plazas and boulevards are to be seen; elsewhere the gridiron layout of the typical American city has been adhered to, except in the newer areas to the east, where attempts have been made to relate development to topography. Racial zonation is well marked. The Chinese community inhabits the narrow streets north of the Escolta in the business quarter, and the principal indigenous residential areas lie north of the city in the crowded districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz. Europeans, Americans, and wealthy Filipinos reside on the higher ground in the districts of Ermita and Malate, south of the river.

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361 Modern Batavia, the immediate forebear of Jakarta, dated from the reconstruction of the old city in the early nineteenth century. The expansion of trade and growth of population in the eighteenth century had made necessary the redevelopment of the town, still closely confined around the old fort. In 1808, Governor General Daendels moved the administrative headquarters to Buitenzorg (now Bogor), pulled down the old fort, and used the material for the construction of a new residential district some three miles south of the old town, on the higher ground of Weltevreden. Three miles south of the new district the military camp of Meester Cornelis was established, and thus the axis of future development was aligned north–south, avoiding the low rice-growing plains on each side.

Weltevreden, like the old town, was laid out on a rectangular pattern around large open squares, the Koningsplein and the Waterlooplein. Later in the nineteenth century the old city itself was largely rebuilt, and many of the canals were filled in, but the Town Hall and the buildings of the East India Company still remain. The old town is now the main business and financial district. Weltevreden has experienced several changes in the present century. The northern part between the Koningsplein and the Molenvliet, one of the surviving canals, has become a secondary business district, and its residential character is tending to disappear. The main European residential districts were in south Weltevreden and the newer Gondangdia and Menteng, where the street pattern is not so uniformly rectilinear. These new districts eventually linked up with the development around the military base of Meester Cornelis, and in 1935 the three old foci, Batavia, Weltevreden, and Meester Cornelis, were united in the Municipality of Batavia. [162] As in Manila, racial segregation was pronounced; the Chinese lived in the old town, and in the lacunae between the developments along the roads the indigenous peoples lived in kampongs, a veritable *rus in urbe*. Since the establishment of the Republic, the city, renamed Jakarta, has changed considerably. The kampong area has been greatly enlarged, and old Dutch street and district names have been discarded. Weltevreden has ceased to have a separate identity, and Meester Cornelis has become Djatinagara.

Bangkok owes its transformation from an overgrown floating village into a modern metropolis to the activities of King Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), the creator of modern Siam, whose reign marked the beginning of commercial rice cultivation in the Menam plain and the teak industry in the north. The development of Bangkok was closely bound up with the exporting and processing of both commodities. The Klong Ong Ang marks the first stage in the expansion of the city, to the east of the Grand Palace; development on the right bank was retarded by the absence of bridges over

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for development.[6] The early mercantile and financial quarter was on the right bank of the Singapore River, where it has remained ever since. Raffles planned a racial residential zonation, the Chinese to be confined to the right bank above the business district, the Europeans to inhabit the opposite bank. Though this was eventually abandoned, Singapore's "Chinatown," with the highest population density in the city, still marks the old Chinese area. The early gridiron pattern was continued in the development to the east, the first direction of expansion. In the nineteenth century the city began to expand onto the somewhat higher land to the north, and here the new European residential district of Tanglin arose; but commercial interests are steadily invading the older part of the better residential areas to the north. With the reclamation in the last 50 years of the numerous swamps that set limits to expansion the lacunae in development have been filled in, and the city sprawls along the south coast of the island for more than 10 miles. Indeed, at no great date in the future the whole island will be effectively urbanized. The Armed Services occupy large areas, and their establishments constitute in effect separate towns. Room for expansion is becoming increasingly difficult to find, but the city's public housing achievements, particularly the new development at Tiong Bahru, on the west side, are worthy of note as being among the best in Asia.

In appearance the five cities are not greatly dissimilar to cities of the West, but there is a more clearly defined zonation of commercial, industrial, and residential development, the last showing a racial differentiation, which, though everywhere tending to break down, is nevertheless still conspicuous. Differences are also discernible in the suburbs, with their two-story "shophouses," and above all in the outer margins, where "temporary" houses of wood thatched with nipa palm cluster together in overgrown kampongs or barrios, engulfed by the outward sprawl of the cities. Here large numbers of indigenous people live in an environment that is neither urban nor rural.

The central business and "downtown" districts are entirely nonindigenous. International banks, commodity exchanges, and great mercantile houses reproduce all the features of the business quarter of the Western city, though there is a steady infiltration by Indian and Chinese financial and mercantile interests. The main shopping areas are also predominantly European, though here again Chinese and Indian establishments are numerous. Congestion is proportionately as great as in the Western city, and none suffers worse in this respect than Manila. Binondo, the main business district, lies on the

[6] For a full account see B. H. G. Dobby: Singapore: Town and Country, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 30, 1940, pp. 84–109.

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rubber, in Singapore; other manufactures are furniture, boats, footwear, glass, bricks and tiles, oils and soaps, electric batteries, and certain chemical products. Manufacturing industries proper use relatively little machinery and power and produce for the home market, in which there is a considerable element of local protection. Food and drink industries are well developed (including brewing and distilling); textiles are poorly developed. Heavy industry is confined to the repair and refitting of vessels. All the ports have forges and foundries for making minor repairs; Singapore and Jakarta, which have dry-dock facilities, can undertake more extensive work. Repair shops for maintenance of railway equipment are located in all the cities except Singapore; the assembly of imported motor vehicles is carried on in Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore. Industry relies largely on electric power, which is expensive because of the paucity of local coal supplies.

Small-scale industry is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese; the larger undertakings are overwhelmingly European-owned, though there are some large Chinese industrial establishments. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of the cities are engaged in industry: in Singapore, where industry is expanding rapidly, only 11 per cent of the adult working population were employed in industrial establishments in the census of 1947. This unduly low figure does not take account of the large employment in the establishments of the Armed Services, much of which was industrial.

The industrial areas lie close to the port or along the rivers and canals. They are surrounded by areas of high population density; for the relatively high cost and limited availability of public transport operate to retard the divorce of place of work and residence, which is so conspicuous a feature of the Western city. Newer industrial areas, however, are appearing on the margins of the cities, and as the range of industrial activity grows, industry is likely to become more widely dispersed.

Population

All the five cities would have probably reached the one-million level in a comparatively short period if the war had not intervened. During the Japanese occupation, population decreased in the cities because of the shortage of food, and the wartime dislocation that elsewhere in Asia resulted in a large influx of rural dwellers into the cities did not operate here. With the end of the war the tide set strongly in the opposite direction. The breakdown of effective administration in many parts of Southeast Asia following the Japanese surrender, armed insurrections against the central governments, the struggle for independence, the depredations of extreme

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factions, and the difficulty of protecting disliked minorities, particularly the Chinese, all combined to attract many rural dwellers to the comparative safety of the cities. This immigration of refugees was perhaps greatest in Saigon–Cholon: from a population of about 300,000 at the time of the Japanese occupation the twin cities have increased to an estimated 1,400,000. Jakarta has grown almost as spectacularly. At the census of 1930 the city of Batavia had a population of a little more than half a million; by 1950 the Indonesian government estimated Jakarta's population to be not less than two million; and at present the city may well contain nearer three million. Even on the most conservative estimate it is by far the most populous city in the whole of Southeast Asia.

In the census of 1948, Greater Manila had a population of 1,180,000; however, several separately recorded districts of Rizal Province are integral parts of the built-up area, and their inclusion raises the total to more than a million and a quarter. The 14 districts of the City of Manila proper showed a 58 per cent increase over the 1939 census figures. Singapore and Bangkok have been relatively unaffected by postwar immigration from the country. In the intercensal period 1931–1947 the population of the island of Singapore grew by some 68 per cent, owing to the gradual establishment of an equality in the sex composition of the Chinese population, together with a steady decline in the death rate; allowing for natural increase since the census, the population of Singapore Colony at present is about 1,100,000, of whom about 70 per cent reside in the municipal area. Before the war Bangkok was approaching 900,000, but in the census of 1947 the population was only 1,116,600;[9] hence the war may have somewhat retarded the city's growth.

The present rate of growth due to natural increase seems to be about 3 per cent a year in all the cities, which is much higher than the rate in their respective national territories. This will present many difficult problems of development. As might be expected, the already overcrowded districts have experienced the greatest increases; in Manila, for example, the districts of Tondo, Sampaloc, and Santa Cruz have increased their populations by 80 per cent or more since 1939. As compared with Western cities, densities in the poorest areas are extremely high; 1500 persons to an acre would not be excessive for the net density of the worst blocks.[10] On the other hand, density

[9] With Thonburi. According to the *Statistical Year Book of Thailand*, N.S., Vol. 1, 1952, recently received, the total for the two is 1,178,881.

[10] Net density is the average density of the population of a given residential area, which consists solely of the dwellings and one-half of the width of streets giving access thereto. The figure quoted here is an estimate by the Singapore Improvement Trust of the situation in the most overcrowded part of the city.

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development in the best residential districts is very low, frequently one or two houses to an acre, so that the cities sprawl widely.

From the beginning, Chinese immigrants have constituted an important element of the cities. At first encouraged, and later feared, by the authorities, the Chinese were confined to special quarters, such as the famous Parián of Manila, where they have tended to remain. Dislike of them has been a universal rallying point of numerous indigenous politicians, and the murder of many Chinese in the period following the Japanese collapse recalls the massacres of the early history of Manila and Batavia. Where immigration has been comparatively free, at least until fairly recent times, the Chinese have become a majority: Singapore is more than 77 per cent Chinese—the largest Chinese community outside China—and in Bangkok more than 60 per cent of the population are Chinese or of mixed Chinese-Thai ancestry. The lower proportions of Chinese in the other three cities are due to the earlier restrictions on immigration, together with an influx of indigenous peoples from rural areas in the postwar period. Events in China, however, have everywhere increased illegal Chinese immigration. The removal of many Chinese from rural Cochin China to the Saigon-Cholon area has raised the percentage of Chinese in Cholon to about 60, and it is probably not less than 30 in the combined cities. In Manila and Jakarta it is much lower, and the total number of Chinese is not easy to estimate; both cities contain more than 50,000, and the number of persons of mixed Chinese and indigenous blood is undoubtedly much larger. Despite many vicissitudes, the Chinese have proved indispensable, and their importance in the economic life of the cities can hardly be overstated.

Europeans constitute only a very small proportion of the population of the cities. Only in prewar Batavia did they amount to as much as 5 per cent of the total, and this was in part due to the inclusion of Eurasians as Europeans in the Dutch statistics. Of the other immigrant groups, the most numerous are Indians and Pakistanis, who in Singapore made up 7 per cent of the population in 1947. Jakarta has a small community of Arabs, engaged in shopkeeping or moneylending.

The indigenous peoples have a higher birth rate than the immigrant peoples, but also a higher death rate, so that the relative proportions of the two groups have tended to remain the same. Lately the migration of indigenous peoples to the cities, especially in the new independent states, has altered the balance somewhat, and the partly alien character of the cities may tend to decline. Simultaneously, restrictions have been placed on the economic activities of the Chinese in the Philippines and Thailand, but the outcome of these measures is unlikely to be that intended.

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Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 85 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

[113] [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

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•162 369 361 significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

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[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

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

THE GREAT CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya, Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are two major core regions, each with its regional capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant over Hanoi, which for reasons of population size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6] In Indonesia densely populated Java has two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the first only twice the size of the second, but Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case, other than Indonesia, the Primate City is from five to ten times as large as the next largest city, and there is no such graded hierarchy of urbanization as in the United States and to a considerable degree in Western European countries and Japan. Secondary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma, Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

The rapid population growth of the six greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This may be true, but it can be argued also that the overwhelming dominance of the Primate City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and that the largest cities will expand more rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in effect only a limited number of services to be performed by cities within a predominantly village and folk society, although it may be industrializing slowly, and the great cities continue to possess a virtual monopoly of these services. Thus, even as a society changes, new and increasingly complex functions tend to be performed by institutions

[6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

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178 already established in the Primate cities. So, to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia
• 162 growth is primarily in the great cities,[9] whereas in the United States in the last
369 three decades at least growth has been more
361 rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

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[8] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population* [*Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore*] [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative security of the city. These forces have been 162 operating in combination particularly in 369 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely 361 rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess many features in common, not the least of 361 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the 369 United States, but there the resemblance 175 ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and Singapore did not yet exist in city form; 178 Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13]

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954.

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localised according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

On the other hand, changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

! [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

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On the other hand, the war also brought increased American influence into the region, and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of the symbols of change that sooner or later will be followed by changes in urban facilities and urban organization.

More important, the present period is associated with an increasing intensification of the economic activities of government and a corresponding diminution of foreign enterprise. Political and administrative functions have become increasingly important since the war. Since the main governmental organs are concentrated in the largest centers, the direct influence of the great city upon the country in which it is primate is likewise increasing. Relations between nationalized city and an increasingly money-oriented countryside are becoming more intimate, and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinctiveness of city and country is rapidly becoming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of the great city's leading a revival of ancient value systems, as some extreme ethnocentrists hope it will, is small. Only one prediction can be made: the days of the culturally alien and ethnically distinct urban center are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city like Singapore becomes increasingly an anomalous relict of an age now past.

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THE PEASANTRY OF SOUTH EAST ASIA [1]

PROFESSOR RAYMOND FIRTH, F.B.A.

000 IF it is not wholly true that the social and economic reconstruction which is so necessary in Asia today must begin with the peasant, it is certain that no programme which omits the peasant can be on firm foundations. The recent history of China is evidence enough for this. My concern, as a social anthropologist, is with the analysis and classification of social relations between people and groups of people, rather than with political or economic affairs as such, although inevitably I cannot dis-
128 regard them. So my aim is to show briefly some of the most important
121 aspects of the social organization of the South East Asian peasant communities, and of the values by which this organization works. Though the details in my paper refer mainly to Malaya and Indonesia, I think the generalizations have some value for the South East Asian region as a whole.

If the basic features of the peasant society are ignored, one can understand neither the peculiar tenacity which it still possesses in modern conditions, nor the reactions of its members to the increasing impact of ex-
121 ternal economic and political forces. The definition of a peasant is a
565 countryman—a man engaged in rural pursuits, primarily agriculture, with
463 a comparatively simple technology and a special interest in the land he works. In South East Asia one may extend the application of the term to
241 cover the majority of fishermen and even village craftsmen too. They are
226 of the same social class as the agriculturalists, and often members of the
32 same families. As occupational groups, they may even be separable only in theory, since many a peasant farmer is also a fisherman or craftsman by turns, as his seasonal cycle or his cash-needs influence him. What R. H. Tawney has said of agriculture—that it is at once a craft, a business, and a manner of life—can be applied more widely here; the problems of all these peasants alike are partly technical, partly financial and commercial, and partly cultural and social.

162 It is difficult to say just what proportion of the present population of
565 South East Asia may be classed as peasants. It would seem that in nearly
241 every South East Asian country two-thirds or more of the total population
463 is to be found in agricultural communities, tilling the soil. In 1930 the
32 census of Java and Madura in Indonesia gave about 70 per cent of the male
462 workers as dependent for their livelihood on native agricultural output, and about 75 per cent in the regions of Indonesia outside Java and Madura, while large numbers of women were engaged in home craft production. In Siam, in about 1930, almost 90 per cent of the population lived in agricultural communities, rice production providing the living of about 80 per

[1] Originally delivered at a meeting at Chatham House on 21 February 1950.

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cent of the population. Malaya, of course, is exceptional, because of the especially heavy concentration on the production of rubber and tin. According to the 1947 census of Malaya, about 34 per cent of the working population were classed as cultivators and fishermen working on their own account or as unpaid members of families. In all, I think one could reckon that rather more than 100 million people in South East Asia can be regarded as peasantry.

Throughout all this region, peasant technology is simple; skills, though traditionally well adapted to the job in hand, are of limited range. Soils, despite the richness of some of the swamps and river flood-plains, are generally of poor quality. The system of felling and burning the jungle, taking off crops for a few years, and then moving away to cultivate fresh clearings while the old ones revert to jungle, is still common in the mountain areas of Burma, Malaya, and Siam, in part of West Java, in much of Borneo, and in the outer islands of Indonesia. It is known as shifting cultivation or jungle-fallowing. Although regarded as extremely primitive, it is an economic use of land in areas of low population density, where plentiful land allows of long rotation of clearings and consequent restoration of soil fertility. But where population is dense, the system cannot provide the necessary volume of production without endangering the future soil capital, and that is one of the major problems of the area. In the more sedentary forms of agriculture, fertility is conserved with a great deal of care, by manuring, by water control, and so on. Sometimes there is very elaborate and spectacular terracing, as in parts of the Philippines or in Bali, where the native cultivator through his own efforts through generations has known how to make the best of the land with his available techniques. Yet many of these techniques are only of limited efficiency, and custom may be a barrier to improvement. For large masses of the Muslim peasantry of South East Asia, for instance, the pig, an excellent economic converter of resources, is taboo for religious reasons.

Productivity of the South East Asian peasant is apt to be low, whether considered in terms of the margins required above subsistence to give him and his family the range of goods and services they want, or by comparison with Western results. It is hard to make this last comparison significant because of the differing bases, but the following figures will give, perhaps rather superficially, some idea of the comparison. In terms of cwt. of cropping per acre, for instance, the rice crop of part of South East Asia can be compared roughly with the wheat crop of Western Europe. The figures are taken from different years, but they can be regarded as significant averages. Java at 12 cwt. of rice to the acre corresponds with France at 12 cwt. of wheat to the acre; Siam at 14 cwt. to the acre with the United Kingdom at 18 cwt. and Germany at a little less; Japan at 27 cwt. of rice per acre corresponds to Denmark with 27 cwt. of wheat per acre. Yet rice is supposed to be a crop of much higher yield. What is more significant is that productivity per acre in both Malaya and Indo-China is only 10 cwt. on the average, or only between one-third and one-half of the average in Japan.

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/Article 23/

Anthropological Blood-Grouping in South-East Asia

By P. H. A. Sneath, M. A., M. B. (Cantab.)

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Summary of a communication to the Institute, 4 February, 1954

Four aboriginal tribes in Malaya and Borneo were studied in association with Dr. I. Polunin of the University of Malaya, as part of the programme of anthropological blood-grouping organized by Dr. A. E. Mourant. Blood samples were collected from the settlements and were tested for the ABO, MNS, Rhesus, P, Lutheran, Kell and Duffy groups and for the sickle-cell trait. Specimens of saliva were also tested for ABH secretion. The more important results are summarized in the table (page 2), in which the salient blood-group features of the main racial types of man are noted for comparison. About 100 samples from each tribe were tested.

The Negritos of Malaya.

The high incidence of the Rhesus gene Ro (cDe) supports the belief that the Negritos and Africans are descended from a common stock. The sickle-cell trait was absent, but there is some doubt whether this trait is a safe criterion of African ancestry. A more serious objection to an African origin for the Negritos is the low frequency of Ro and the absence of the trait in the Andaman Negritos, recently reported by Lehmann and Ikin (personal communication).

The Malayan Senoi.

The racial affinities of the Senoi have been much discussed, and some have suggested that they are related to the Veddas or to the Australoids. The blood groups of the Senoi are quite different from those of the Australian aborigines; the latter lack the genes B and S and have low M, while the Senoi possess considerable amounts of all three. There are few data on Veddoid blood groups. The groups of the Senoi are similar to those of Mongoloids, and this strongly supports the theory that the Senoi are closer to the Mongoloids

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TABLE I. RACIAL FREQUENCIES OF BLOOD-GROUP GENES AND FREQUENCIES IN FOUR ABORIGINAL TRIBES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

System	Gene	Caucasoids	Australoids	Negroids	Mongoloids	Negritos	Senoi	Aboriginal Malays	Land Dayaks
ABO	A	High (0.3)	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	0.15	0.05	0.12	0.21
	B	Low	ABSENT	High (0.3)	High*	0.09	0.24	0.20	0.31
	A_2	Moderate	Absent	High (0.0)	Absent	0	0	0	0
MNS	N	Moderate	HIGH (0.9)	Moderate	Low	0.27	0.28	0.21	0.33
	S	HIGH (0.3)	ABSENT	Moderate	Low	0.14	0.09	0.03	0.01
Rh	r (cde)	HIGH (0.4)	Absent	Moderate	Absent	0	0	0	0
	Ro (cDe)	Low	Moderate	HIGH (0.)	Low	0.27	0.01	0.01	0.07
	R_1 (CDe)	Moderate	Moderate	LOW	HIGH (0.8)	0.63	0.93	0.94	0.85
	R_2 (cDE)	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Moderate ‡	0.10	0.07	0.04	0.08
Duffy	Fy^a	Moderate	High (0.9)	Low	High	0.5		0.7	
Sickle-cell trait		Absent	Absent	High †	Absent	Absent		Absent	

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* Absent in America † Also in Veddoids ‡ High in America (0.4)

The figures in parentheses after "High" show the average gene frequency of the gene in that race which possesses the highest frequency.

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than to any other race.

The Aboriginal Malays.

The blood groups confirm that these people are Mongoloids, being similar to those of most peoples of Malaysia.

The Land Dayaks of Borneo.

The blood groups of the Land Dayaks were found to be of the Malaysian type.

Variability in Blood Groups of Settlements.

Great variation was found in blood groups between settlements of the same tribe. It was noted in all four peoples, and is presumably due to settlement endogamy (known to be common in Land Dayaks and Aboriginal Malays). Although this lessens the value of blood-grouping as a means of tracing racial ancestry, it may throw light on the way in which races arise: for instance, the suggestion that the American Indians lack blood group B because they are descended from a few small tribes who, by chance, lacked the gene is supported by examples of the virtual absence of common genes in some settlements which we studied.

The variability is thought to be due largely to genetic drift, though doubtless other factors are also responsible. The possibility of such variation, usually ignored in blood-group work, should always be considered in surveys of this area (see Polunin, Man, 1952, 104).

A full account of this work is to be published.